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The pervasive social policy underlying the Anglo-American
law on succession of property at death is freedom of testa-
tion.1 Our law makes meaningful one's right to decide who shall
inherit his property by providing a legal instrument, the will, to
distribute property to chosen recipients.
When a man dies without having exercised this right, however,
the laws of intestate succession determine who shall receive his
property, and in what shares it shall be received. In effect, the
laws of intestate succession are an estate plan written for the
decedent by his state legislature. These laws do not function as a
restriction upon the freedom of testation; rather they serve as an
alternative to it. It is generally thought that laws of intestate
succession should distribute the estate of a man who dies without
having written a will in the manner he would have chosen had he
written one. 2 A statutory pattern of estate distribution should
therefore reflect an appraisal of probabilities. The legislature
should attempt to determine how most persons would distribute
their estates and then create rules of succession to carry out this
pattern. It does not appear, however, that the present laws of
intestate succession accurately mirror the usual dispositive
wishes of the average person. Indeed, recent quantitative re-
search based on experience indicates the contrary and highlights
*Mr. Mulder is a member of the Editorial Board of Prospectus.
IT. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 5 (2d ed. 1953) "Social and Econo-
mic Bases of Succession" [hereinafter cited as T. ATKINSON].2 A. Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30
U. CHI. L. REV. 241 (1963). Professor Dunham cites, among others, PARRY, THE
LAW OF SUCCESSION 158 (2d ed. 1947); and COMMITTEE ON INQUIRY INTO THE LAW
OF SUCCESSION IN SCOTLAND, CMD. No. 8144, at 8 (1957). See also, MODEL
PROBATE CODE (1946), Introductory Comment.
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the need for reform of the intestate succession laws. In England,
the committee responsible for rewriting the laws of intestate suc-
cession in 1951 examined a sample of wills in order to in-
ferentially determine the dispositive wishes of those who had not
written wills.3 Two recent American studies have followed in the
footsteps of the English will studies. Professor Allison Dunham
of the University of Chicago Law School gathered a random
sample of estates probated in Cook County, Illinois, in 1953, and
another random sample in 1957 and analyzed them to determine,
among other things, the tendency of wills to depart from the
distributive pattern of the Illinois Statute of Descent and Dis-
tribution.4 A team of two sociologists and a lawyer at Case
Western Reserve University made a similar study of Cuyahoga
County, Ohio estates as identified through probate court records
of estates closed in 1965. 5 The studies concluded that the dis-
tributive pattern of the English, Illinois and Ohio statutes of
intestate succession do not accurately conform to present dis-
tributive desires, and that revision of these laws was required in
order to ensure distribution of the estate to those whom the
studies indicated would have been the most likely recipients had a
will been written.
6
aSee REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LAWS OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION, ENGLAND,
CMD. No. 8310, at 3-7 (1951).4Dunham supra note 2, at 241-285.
5 M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE (1968) [hereinafter
cited as M. SUSSMAN]; this volume is presently in the form of an unpublished
manuscript available at the University of Michigan Law School Library. Prior to the
Dunham and the Sussman studies, there were other efforts made to collect and
correlate information from investigations of samples of wills. J. WEDGEWOOD, THE
ECONOMICS OF INHERITANCE (1929) was a British investigation which reported
economic data similar to that found in the Dunham study. Powell & Looker, Dece-
dent's Estates, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 919 (1930) analyzed judicial statistical records
and inheritance tax figures over a period of time in several counties of New York.
Ward & Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIs. L. REV. 393
was a study of Dane County, Wisconsin, probate records. The authors compiled a
sample of 415 probate proceedings from the death certificates for the years 1929,
1934, 1939, 1941 and 1944. Professor Dunham relied heavily upon the research
method and findings of the Wisconsin study in the design and analysis of his project.
6See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LAWS OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION, ENGLAND,
CMD. No. 8310, at 3-7 (1957); A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 257; and M. SUSSMAN,
supra note 5, at Chap. 3. In addition to the will studies, other legal writers on the
subject of intestate succession have proposed reform of state laws. See Jones, Ala-
bama Probate Law-Need for Revision of Interstate Provisions, 20 ALA. L. REV. 1
(1967); and J. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING at Chapter 11, Estate Plan Created By
Operation of Law (3rd ed., 1961).
This urge for reform is not surprising, however, since most state intestate succes-
[Vol. 3:2
May 1970] Uniform Probate Code
Indeed, intestate succession laws not only require reform of
their substantive dispositive provisions, but they also require
procedural reform. Present probate practices have been criticized
as oppressive, costly and time consuming. The statistics gathered
by the Chicago study strongly suggest that the public has trans-
lated verbal criticism of probate practices into the active pursuit
of probate avoidance. 7
The final, approved draft of the Uniform Probate Code8 makes
sion laws are a product of a legal heritage rooted in feudal England and have seldom
undergone revision. T. ATKINSON, supra note I, § 14. For example, Michigan still
divides property into real and personal property and applies different rules in dis-
tributing each category of property. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 702.80 (1968). This
distinction may have made sense in a society where real estate comprised the basis of
wealth. There is, however, little to justify it in contemporary society where wealth is
often in the form of personal property such as investment securities.
Moreover, existing state intestacy laws fail to meet adequately the demands of the
small estate owner. Consider, for example, the provision in a majority of state
intestate succession laws which distributes the estate one-third to the surviving
spouse and two-thirds to the issue regardless of the size of the estate. T. ATKINSON,
supra note I, § 15. See also 3 C. VERRIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 227 (1935).
The will studies clearly indicate that most small estate owners desire to give their
entire estate to the surviving spouse. This pattern varies only when the estate is
sufficiently large that avoidance of Federal estate taxes plays an important role.
However, since owners of large estates generally leave wills, this exception to the
"spouse all" pattern should not affect the design of intestate laws. To this extent, the
will studies demonstrate that present state intestate laws are not responsive to the
needs of the contemporary estate owner, who typically wishes his spouse to receive
the assets of the estate for support and family maintenance.
7Eighty-five percent of the deaths in the Chicago study never resulted in a probate
proceeding. A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 244. Similar results were found in exam-
ination of the years 1941 through 1951 -merely fifteen percent of the deaths involved
a probate proceeding. Id. No doubt some people do not accumulate assets in excess
of the amount exempted from probate. However, the statistics gathered by Prof.
Dunham on the number of persons who own life insurance, on the high degree of
home ownership and the number of savings accounts in banks and savings institutions
would indicate that most people have sufficient wealth to warrant probate. Id. at 247.
Perhaps an explanation of the small percentage of probated estates lies in the use of
the so-called will substitutes to avoid probate. The transfer at death of life insurance,
intervivos and savings bank (Totten) trusts, jointly held property with the right of
survivorship such as joint bank accounts, investment securities holdings and real
estate tranferred before death does not require probate. T. ATKINSON, supra note I,
88 38-45.
In addition to will substitutes as a means of avoiding probate, it has been suggested
that people are willing to use any scheme or device even if it borders on the illegal, to
avoid probate. Letter from Professor Richard V. Wellman to Professor Marvin
Sussman, April 17, 1968, on file in the University of Michigan Law Library with the
manuscript of M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5. See also N. DACEY, How to A void Probate
(1965). The popularity of the Dacey book indicates current attitudes toward probate
and public willingness to circumvent it.
8UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, and approved by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association (August 1969), Article I, part I [hereinafter cited as U.P.C.]
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significant departures from the procedural provisions and from
the distributive patterns of intestate estates found under state
intestate laws.
The Code adopts the traditional view that intestate laws should
mirror the dispositive intentions of the average person. As the
general comments which preface the article on intestacy point
out, the Code's drafters found state statutes to be antiquated. 9
Thus, they revised the succession pattern in an attempt to make it
responsive to contemporary problems and dispositive desires.' 0
The Code is therefore problem responsive rather than historically
oriented and represents more than an updated version of state
intestacy laws. More specifically, the intestate rules of the Code
are designed to provide an estate plan for the small estate owner
who would ordinarily not write a will."
Inasmuch as the drafters of the Code have decided to focus on
the dispositive wishes of small estate owners in formulating new
intestacy laws, an accurate evaluation of the Code requires a
determination of the wisdom of the drafters' decision. Such a
determination depends upon an accurate delineation of that class
of people who typically die intestate and therefore require the
protection of the law. The empirical evidence generated by the
will studies regarding intestacy provides valuable information in
analyzing the soundness of the Code's position. Accordingly, this
article will analyze the specific dispositive provisions of the Code
9U.P.C. Article II, General Comment to Part 1.
10 Address by Professor Richard V. Wellman, chief reporter for the Uniform Probate
Code, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Honolulu,
Hawaii, August 4, 1967, in UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Working Draft Number Three
at 12-13 (hereinafter cited as R.V. Wellman, Hawaii Address). Professor Wellman
has indicated that the drafters of the Code derived their knowledge of the current
dispositive desires of intestate persons from two sources. The experience of the
probate bar, whose members have helped all types of clients write a variety of wills,
provided the drafters with an intimate awareness of the problems facing a testator and
knowledge of how these testators desired to solve their problems. A second source of
information came from the recent will studies made by Professor Dunham in Chi-
cago, by the committee for revising the English probate laws in England and by
Professors Ward and Beuscher in Dane County, Wisconsin. See note 5 supra. The
Cleveland study was not utilized by the drafters since it was not produced until after
the Code was written. However, Professor Wellman has informed the author that the
data of the Cleveland study has been most persuasively used in presentations of the
Code to the National Commission on Uniform State Laws.
"The general comments to the intestacy article of the Code state: "A principal purpose of
this Article.. . is to provide suitable rules... for the person of modest means who
relies on the estate plan provided by law." U.P.C., Article 11, General Comment to
Part 1. [Emphasis added]
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in light of the data generated by the studies. However, it is first
necessary to determine whether the studies are an appropriate
standard to use in examining the provisions of the Code.
II. The Will Studies
A. Methodology and Utility
As the basis of the Chicago study, Professor Dunham used
ninety-seven estates for which probate proceedings were initiated
in 1953 and seventy-three estates of persons who died in 1957.12
The earlier sample was obtained from a random selection of
estates opened in Cook County in 1953. A different, more com-
plicated procedure was used to select the 1957 sample. Rather
than selecting the sample directly from Probate Court records,
Professor Dunham employed the first 500 death certificates is-
sued in 1957 in his sample. He excluded all non-residents of
Cook County and persons who were under the age of twenty at
the time of death. The name index of the Probate Court records
was then compared to the names on the death certificates. This
procedure yielded the seventy-three estates which were sub-
sequently investigated. In the Cleveland study, Professor Suss-
man and his colleagues obtained a five percent random sample of
all estates closed in Cuyahoga County Probate Court between
November 9, 1964, and August 8, 1965.13 There were 659 dece-
dent estates in this sample. In addition to investigating these
estates, Professor Sussman and his co-workers interviewed the
survivor population. The survivor population was defined as le-
gatees and devisees, contingent beneficiaries, and all those eligible
to inherit from the decedent under the Ohio Statute of Descent
and Distribution, whether or not they actually inherited. These
interviews were designed to ascertain the extent of the heirs' or
would-be heirs' satisfaction with the dispositions affecting them,
and to determine the dispositive intentions of the survivor class
itself.
The most significant contribution of these will studies toward
the revision of intestate succession laws is the quantitative in-
formation they provide on the patterns of distribution chosen by
testators. The data indicate the extent to which present laws of
12A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 241-242.
1
3 M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter 11I at 16-17.
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intestate succession actually reflect the contemporary dispositive
pattern evidenced by wills. If the will studies demonstrate that the
distributive pattern chosen by testators deviates from that pro-
vided by current laws of intestate succession, then these laws
should be changed unless: (a) intestate laws should deviate from
the normal testate pattern in order to encourage people to write
wills, or (b) the dispositive wishes of those who make wills vary
from the wishes of those who do not.
Proposition (a) appears to be contrary to the philosophy of
freedom of testation which underlies the law of wills. An in-
ducement to write a will is inconsistent with this principle since
freedom of testation implies the right to an untrammeled choice in
deciding whether to write a will. To punish an intestate for failing
to exercise his choice would make testation a duty, not a right.
The position of the Code, as expressed in the comments to the
article on intestacy, is that the law should provide for the needs
and desires of the largest possible number of persons. If a person
feels his needs differ from the norm, he has the option of writing a
will in harmony with those needs.
Proposition (b) strikes at the central premise of the will studies.
The studies assume that the dispositive wishes of testators are
similar to those of intestate persons, and that the distributive
patterns espoused by testators can therefore serve as guidelines
for rules of intestate succession. However, if proposition (b) is
correct, the utility of the will studies' data in the reform of
intestate succession laws is doubtful. In the Cleveland study, the
authors interviewed a sample of "survivors" selected on the basis
of their relationship to the decedent sample. A proponent of
proposition (b) would predict that differences in dispositive de-
sires would exist between testate and intestate persons. Yet the
results of the interviews demonstrated remarkable similarity of
views among the two groups. 14 This result, as well as common
sense, would indicate that proposition (b) is incorrect.
141d. Chapter VI at 34-37. Professor Sussman found that people who wrote wills usually
left the entire estate to the spouse. On the other hand, the Ohio intestate law required
the estate to be divided between the spouse and the children. Among the survivor
class, however, adult children usually signed over their share of the estate to the
spouse, thus giving the spouse the entire estate. One exception to the "spouse-all"
pattern was found in both testate and intestate cases where the decedent left children
from a prior marriage. In such situations, most testators divided their estate between
the second spouse and the stepchildren. In the survivor class, stepchildren did not
[Vol. 3:2
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Since most testate persons use attorneys to write their wills,
the dispositive patterns of wills reflect the advice of legal counsel.
By using the will studies data as a model for constituting intestate
dispositive provisions, intestate persons indirectly receive the
benefit of this legal counsel. In this manner, small estate owners
who probably cannot otherwise afford legal services receive the
advantages of such services.
B. Predictive Factors of Testacy
The will studies have isolated certain characteristics which
describe the owner of an intestate estate. 15 Among these charac-
teristics, the most important are wealth, age, and occupation. 16
1. Wealth
Wealth, defined in the Cleveland will study as capital accumu-
lation, was closely correlated with testacy. In the Chicago study,
Professor Dunham discovered that ninety percent of the wealth
transmitted at death through probate was transmitted by will,
although only approximately sixty percent of the decedents with
estates in probate had written wills. 1 7 On an individual basis, this
sign over their share of the estate to the second spouse. See text accompanying notes
58-59 infra in this connection. Equality of distribution among the children of the
decedent was more popular among children of intestate persons than testators.
Slightly more than half of the testators deviated from equality of distribution between
equally related kin. Nearly seventy-five percent of those who received through
intestacy were satisfied with equal treatment and did not redistribute the estate. The
greatest area of divergence between testate and intestate distribution occurred among
gifts to remote heirs where testators did not follow the blood line as does the
distribution pattern of the Ohio intestate succession laws. The testator often made
gifts to non-related persons.
15
0f all the estates in the Chicago survey which resulted in some type of probate
proceeding, forty-two percent of the estates belong to persons who died intestate. A.
DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 248. Professor Sussman calculated that thirty-one percent
of the estates in the Cleveland survey were owned by persons who died intestate. M.
SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter IV at 3. The two studies indicate that approximately
one-third of the probated estates belong to people who do not have wills. This
statistic along does not tell us, of course, who is likely to die intestate. It does,
however, reveal the importance of the intestate succession laws and suggests the
necessity for creating an acceptable statutory estate plan.
16See A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 248-251 and M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter III
at 9-13 where these factors are set forth to explain the phenomenon of testacy, and
M. SUSSMAN, Chapter IV at 5-34, which records the data that supports this hypo-
thesis.
17A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 250-251. See also Stephenson, Trust Business in Hawaii,
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represented an average gross testate estate of $41,885 as com-
pared with an average gross intestate estate of $7,920.18 The
Cleveland study reported similar figures: an average gross testate
estate of $41,218, and an average gross intestate estate of
$8,599.19
Although the definition of wealth as capital accumulation
worked well for associating wealth with testacy in the decedent
sample, Professor Sussman felt that it was an inadequate defini-
tion for the "survivor class." In Sussman's opinion, many survi-
vors would be reluctant to disclose their total assets. Moreover,
he felt that the capital accumulations of this youthful group would
not be indicative of their eventual wealth. For this latter category,
therefore, wealth was defined as income; a high income was
thought likely to produce substantial capital accumulation. In-
deed, income was shown to be a good indicator of testacy in the
"survivor class." 20 Thus, capital accumulation (or a high income
and the concomitant likelihood of capital accumulation) appears
to be a major factor underlying the decision to write a will.
Conversely, persons with small estates are statistically more like-
ly to die intestate.
2. Age
Age appears to be a second important factor in predicting
testacy. Professor Dunham found that ninety percent of the wills
he investigated had been written within ten years of the testator's
death. 21 Given today's average life expectancy, Professor Dun-
ham's findings indicate that most persons who write wills do not
do so until their late fifties. Unfortunately, Professor Dunham
could not obtain information on whether earlier wills had been
executed, and thus whether testators rewrite their wills in light of
changing family needs and capital accumulations. Nevertheless, it
would seem fair to conclude, as a general proposition, that in-
testacy is a function of age; the older the person, the more likely
100 ESTATES AND TRUSTS 73 (1961). Stephenson reports that in Hawaii in 1948 it
was estimated that 85 percent of the total property transmitted at death passed under
a will.
18A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 264.
19 M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter IV at 19.
201d. Chapter IV at 23.2 1A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 279.
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he is to write a will. The Cleveland study supports this hypo-
thesis. That study revealed that the percentage of testate persons
increased with age; twenty-five percent of those in the twenties
age group were testate, forty-one percent in the thirties age group,
and seventy-eight percent in the sixties age group.
2 2
3. Occupation
Occupation was perhaps the third most important predictive
factor of testacy. In the Chicago study, the group labelled
"proprietors" were statistically most likely to execute wills; nine-
ty-one percent were testate in 1957.23 The results of the Cleve-
land study add further support to this generalization.2 4 Neither
study, however, generated any data to explain the relationship
between occupational status and testacy. One may only speculate
as to the explanation of this phenomenon. It seems the most
likely explanation is that people with high occupational status
tend to have greater accumulations of wealth than those in lower
positions.
25
However, occupation proved to be a poor indicator of testacy
in the Cleveland survey for persons over sixty.2 6 In this group,
age seemed to be the overriding factor in predicting testacy. This
result emphasizes the need for an accurate determination of the
interrelationship between wealth, age, and occupation as pre-
dictive factors of testacy.
22M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter IV at 6.
23A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 248. The heirarchy of occupational status used in both the
Chicago and the Cleveland studies was the Hollingshead Index. A. HOLLINGS-EAD,
Two FACTOR INDEX OF SOCIAL POSITION (New Haven, Conn. 1957) (Mimeograph).
The class of "proprietors" were defined as persons in management or the professions.
See A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 245. See also M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter
IV at 24.
24See M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter IV at 25, 29.25See discussion of capital accumulation as a factor predictive of testacy in text accom-
panying notes 17-20 supra. Perhaps an additional factor is that persons who rate high
on an occupational scale are generally more familiar with planning for the future due
in part to the nature of their positions as proprietors, managers and professional
people and the concommitant need for expertise in long-range planning.
2 6See M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter IV at 25-26. Testacy was correlated with high
occupational status for both decedents and survivors. In the decedent sample, how-
ever, the relationship held only for those under sixty. Professor Sussman's data show




4. Interrelationship of Predictive Factors
Perhaps the simplest way to illustrate this interrelationship is to
examine the course of a man's life span. In his twenties, he is
statistically most likely to be intestate. 27 Age clearly is the ex-
planation for the low testacy rate at this point.28 Death seems far
off, and the need for a will appears remote. 29 In the Cleveland
study, the thirties and forties proved to be a time of frequent will
making in the lives of the "survivor class." Two thirds of the
testate "survivor class" had written wills by age forty-five.
30
However, age can probably be discounted as the paramount ex-
planation for this phenomenon. Rather, wealth and occupation
are better indicators of testacy during this time of a person's life.
By age forty-five, a man has established himself in his career and
has generally accumulated some wealth. In addition, the respon-
sibilities of maintaining a family are evident. Professor Dunham
suggests that a fourth factor may be involved: the educative
process of going through probate. He found that only thirty per-
cent of those women who predeceased their spouses were testate
while seventy-five percent of those who survived their husbands
were testate.31 The difference was not as pronounced for men.
Yet men with children who predeceased their wives were testate
in half the cases while three out of five of those who survived
their spouses were testate.3 2 To Professor Dunham, this evidence
"suggests that a previous experience with death and its property
Table XVII-Correlation of Ranks By
Occupation and Percent Testate -- Age
Controlled for Decedent Sample
Spearman's
Number Rho Percent
Entire group 461 .79 .05
Ages
21-49 40 .80 .05
50-59 75 1.00 .01
60-69 127 .53 no t significant
70-79 151 .07 no t significant
80-89 64 .63 no t significant
271d. Chapter IV at 6.
28See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.29M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter IV at 41. Prof. Sussman suggests that those who do
write wills during their twenties are conscious of the burden of providing for a family.301d. Chapter IV at 12.31A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 249.32 1d.
[Vol. 3:2
Uniform Probate Code
problems in the immediate family tends to induce both men and
women to have wills."3
3
In the older age groups, such as the sixties, seventies and
eighties, the percentage of testate persons steadily increases.
Seventy-eight percent of those in their sixties and eighty-two
percent of those in their seventies had written wills in the dece-
dent sample of the Cleveland study.3 4 The recognition of the
proximity of death doubtless accounts for the high rate of testacy
in these age groups.
Of the three indicators of testacy, age seems to be the most
significant.35 It is the probable explanation of the low testacy rate
for the young and the high rate for the old. Occupation and
wealth do not seem especially significant indicators of testacy for
these groups. Yet the frequency of testacy among the forties
group indicates that the imminence of death alone cannot account
for the rate of testacy; other factors must be considered. Wealth
and occupation seem to operate somewhat independently from
age and would account for the frequency of testacy during middle
age.
In summary, the will studies indicate that those who typically
die intestate are the young, those who have accumulated only
modest possessions, and those of rather low occupational status.
It seems unlikely that many persons in these groups feel a com-
pelling need to write a will. The decision on the part of the Code's
drafters to concentrate on small estate owners in designing a
realistic statutory estate plan is thus supported by the findings of
the will studies. It is not clear, however, that the Code has fully
achieved its goal of drafting intestate succession provisions which
will effectuate the dispositive desires of most intestate decedents.
The remainder of this article will attempt to highlight those dis-
positive provisions in which the Code has, in the author's opinion,
fallen short of its express purpose. Various definitional sections of
the Code will be analyzed in the light of recent reform efforts of
state legislatures. Finally, the sections of the Code which govern
the administration and duration of intestate probate proceedings
331d.
34 M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter IV at 11.
35 1d. Chapter IV at 33.
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Prospectus
will be examined to determine whether the Code provides a more
expeditious, less complicated, and less costly alternative to
present probate practices.
Ill. The Statutory Estate Plan of the Uniform Probate Code
A. Share of the Spouse
1. The Code's Dispositive Scheme
The Uniform Probate Code makes no distinction between real
and personal property; both descend by the same pattern.3 6 The
Code also abolishes the common-law concepts of dower and
curtesy.3 7 Under section 2-102, the spouse's share varies ac-
cording to four contingencies:
(1) If no surviving issue or parent of dece-
dent, spouse takes entire intestate estate;
(2) If no surviving issue but decedent is
survived by a parent(s), spouse takes first
$50,000 plus one-half the balance;
(3) If there are surviving issue and all of
them are issue of the decedent-spouse mar-
riage, spouse takes the first $50,000 plus
one-half the balance; (Emphasis added)
(4) If there are surviving issue of the dece-
dent and one or more are not issue of the
decedent-spouse marriage, spouse takes
one-half of the net intestate estate. (Emphasis
added)
2. Spouse: Sole Survivor
The will studies clearly support the plan adopted for the situ-
ation in section 2-102(1). Nearly ninety percent of the testators in
the Cleveland study gave their entire estate to the spouse when
no issue or parent survived.38 Twenty-seven of the twenty-eight
testators in the Chicago sample followed this pattern.3 9
3. Spouse and Decedent's Parents
Section 2-102(2) is an attempt by the drafters to deal with the
36U.P.C., Article II, General Comment to Part 1.
37U.P.C., § 2-113 and Article 11, General Comment to Part 1I.
38 M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter V at 9.
39
A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 253.
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problem of a short decedent-spouse marriage. 40 A primary reason
for including the decedent's parents in the distribution of the
estate is that when the decedent of a short decedent-spouse mar-
riage leaves an estate exceeding $50,000, it is probable that the
parents of the intestate provided a good share of the assets in the
estate. Section 2-102(2) serves to return a portion of those assets
to their source. 41 It is possible that an intestate could leave
surviving parents and no issue after a marriage which has lasted
for a relatively long period. Parents are unlikely to be major
contributors of property in marriages of long duration. Under
these circumstances, section 2-102(2) apparently is designed to
retain a portion of the estate within the decedent's own blood
line. 42 Section 2-801 complements section 2-102(2) by allowing
the intestate's parents to renounce their share if they desire to
give the spouse the entire estate.
Under present law, most states include both the parents and
the spouse in the distribution. 43 The will studies failed to generate
any data regarding this distributive pattern. Without clear data
justifying a different pattern, the drafters apparently decided to
adopt the status quo.A4 The author suggests that the general
spouse-all pattern which seemed to hold for marriages of all
durations indicates that section 2-102(2) should be changed.45 To
suggest that the spouse be given the entire estate is admittedly a
value judgment; yet, married persons have established a new
family unit, and each spouse probably feels the property of one
belongs to the other.
4. Spouse and Issue
a. Proposed Amendment to Section 2-102(3)
The pattern for section 2-102(3) seeks to: (a) give the spouse a
larger share than most state statues provide, (b) take maximum
4 0
See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Working Drafts Numbers One, Three, and Five.
41
Interview with Professor Richard V. Wellman, October 7, 1969.
4 2
1d.
43T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, § 17.
44 Interview supra note 41.
4M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter XIII at 3-4. An exception to the "spouse-all"
pattern occurs when the decedent has left stepchildren. In this situation, the testator
divides the estate between the recent spouse and the stepchildren. See note 14 supra.
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advantage of the marital deduction, 46 and, (c) in the case of
estates under $50,000, give the entire estate to the spouse to
avoid the protective proceedings which may be necessary when
the property passes outright to minor children. 47 Michigan law,
for example, gives only one-third to the spouse and two-thirds to
the surviving children.48 Data from the will studies indicate that
'this statutory allotment does not correspond to the actual wishes
of most testators. In the Cleveland sample, Professor Sussman
discovered that eighty-five percent of the testate persons willed
their entire estate to the spouse when a spouse and children
survived. 49 More dramatic is Professor Sussman's finding that in
seventy-one percent of the intestate dispositions studied where
issue survived the decedent, the issue voluntarily redistributed
the property by giving the spouse all or a greater share of the
estate.50 In the Chicago sample, all of the testators gave the entire
estate to the spouse when spouse and children survived. 51 Thus it
seems clear that most testators give all their estate to their spouse
in order to provide for her 52 during the remainder of her life, and
rely upon the spouse to leave the property to their children. In
light of this finding, the author suggests amending the Code's
pattern for the situation in section 2-102(3). Rather than giving
the first $50,000 plus one-half the remainder to the spouse, the
surviving spouse should take the entire estate.
In giving the entire estate to the spouse, however, one runs the
risk that the spouse will disinherit the children. This problem, of
course, could be avoided by giving a substantial part of the
property outright to the children, as most state statutes presently
provide. The drafters of the Code have apparently chosen a
middle course between the conflicting economic interests of the
spouse and of the children by giving the spouse the first $50,000,
46 Interview, supra note 41.
47U.P.C. § 5-401 defines protective proceedings as a procedure by which the court may,
upon petition and after a hearing, appoint a conservator to manage and protect the
property owned by a minor if the court determines that the minor is incapable of
managing the property.
4 8
MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 702.80 and 702.93 (1968).
49 M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter VI at 8.
50 1d. Chapter VI at 36.5 1A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 263.




and one-half of the remaining estate to the children. In taking this
position, the Code and existing state law seemingly adopt an
attitude of distrust toward the spouse. The will studies indicate,
however, that this is not an attitude shared by most testators. 53 In
a uniform code that seeks to write a will for all intestate persons,
such a blanket attitude of distrust seems inappropriate. Rather,
where such distrust actually exists, one of two alternatives should
be provided; the individual should be left to implement his own
testamentary desires through a will, or the probate judge should
be vested with discretionary power to require that the spouse post
bond, or, if necessary, give the children an immediate share in the
estate.5
4
b. The Marital Deduction and Proposed Section 2-102(3)
Giving the entire estate to the spouse would not vitiate the
Code's attempt to take maximum advantage of the marital deduc-
tion. Under section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code, a marital
deduction is allowed from the gross estate of the decedent equal
to the value of the property passing outright to the spouse, but not
in excess of one-half the adjusted gross estate.55 When the spouse
receives only one-third of the estate, as under most state laws, the
estate does not receive the maximum possible deduction. How-
ever, when the spouse receives the first $50,000 and one-half the
balance of the entire estate, the estate will receive maximum
benefit from the marital deduction. Likewise, when the spouse
takes the entire estate, the maximum marital deduction is avail-
able; thus, the actual estate tax is the same whether the spouse
takes the entire estate or only $50,000 plus one-half the balance.
An illustration will make this clear.
53See note 6 supra.
5 4The purpose of the informal probate proceedings of the Uniform Probate Code is to
eliminate judicial proceedings in this area when they are unnecessary. See U.P.C.,
Article 111, Introduction. In keeping with this policy, the judge should be given
discretionary powers to set bond or give the decedent's children a share in the estate
only where an interested party believes that the spouse cannot be trusted to provide
for minor children or that she is most likely to disinherit the children and requests
court assistance. Code section 3-305 vests the registrar of the court with the dis-
cretionary power to refuse informal appointment of a personal representative. This
would force a court proceeding to appoint formally a personal representative and
would allow imposition of a bond if necessary.
55 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2053. Adjusted gross estate is the gross estate reduced by
funeral expenses, state inheritance taxes, administrative expenses and losses during
the period of administration caused by theft or casualty.
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State Law: Spouse receives one-third either Code: Proposal:
before or after tax depending on state law and Spouse receives Spouse
its judicial interpretations. We shall assume be- $50,000 plus one- receives all.
fore taxes. half the balance.
State Law Code Proposal
Adjusted Gross
Estate: $150,000 $150,000 $150,000
Spouse's share 50,000 100,000 150,000
Marital Deduction: 50,000 75,000 75,000
§ 2052 Deduction: 56  60,000 60,000 60,000
Taxable Estate: 40,000 15,000 15,000
Under the Code, the surviving spouse would receive $100,000 in
this hypothetical situation. The entire $100,000 would qualify for
the marital deduction since the property is included in determin-
ing the value of the adjusted gross estate and passes to the spouse
free of any contingencies. Thus the maximum marital deduction
of $75,000 would be utilized. Under the author's proposal, the
surviving spouse would receive $150,000 worth of property quali-
fying for the marital deduction. Hence, the maximum marital
deduction of $75,000 will similarly be available when the surviv-
ing spouse receives the entire estate.
One disadvantage of the author's proposal, however, is the
potentially greater tax liability which may arise when the property
passes to the children upon the death of the spouse. When the
surviving spouse takes the entire estate of the decedent, the
assets of the estate are taxed twice; that is, they are taxed once in
the decedent's estate, and again in the estate of the surviving
spouse at the time of her death.
Maximum tax savings are achieved only by minimizing this
type of double taxation. If the spouse is given exactly one-half of
the adjusted gross estate, and this property qualifies for the marit-
al deduction, then the maximum benefit of the marital deduction
will be realized. Since the surviving spouse receives only one-half
of the decedent's estate, none of the estate will encounter the
above type of double taxation inasmuch as her share is not tax-
56
1NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2052, authorizes an exemption of $60,000 from a decedent's
gross estate for purposes of the federal estate tax.
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able and the other half will go directly to others. If, however, the
surviving spouse takes less than one-half, she will not realize the
maximum benefit of the marital deduction. On the other hand, if
she receives more than one-half, while the full benefit of the
marital deduction is realized, a portion of the estate is then sub-
ject to double taxation.
The Code approaches the point of maximum tax savings more
closely than does the author's proposal. Under the Code, the
surviving spouse receives the first $50,000 plus one-half the re-
mainder of the estate. Thus, if the adjusted gross estate totals
$150,000, the spouse will receive $100,000, and the marital de-
duction will be $75,000, one-half the adjusted gross estate. The
$25,000 difference between the property received by the spouse
and the marital deduction may be subject to taxation again upon
the spouse's death. On the other hand, if the spouse takes the
entire adjusted gross estate of $150,000, then the $75,000
difference may be subject to double taxation. The Code, there-
fore, would provide greater tax savings than the savings available
under the author's proposal.
c. Advantages of Proposed Section 2-102(3)
Section 2-102(3) will not produce maximum tax savings. In
addition to potential double taxation, the Code provision does not
apply to property which passes outside of probate such as life
insurance proceeds, joint property, joint bank accounts, and inter
vivos trusts. If the assets transferred outside of probate went to
the surviving spouse, she must then receive less that one-half the
probate assets if she is to take precisely the amount of property to
qualify for the marital deduction. Similarly, if the assets trans-
ferred outside probate went to persons other than the surviving
spouse, she would have to take more than one-half the probate
assets lest her share of the property of the decedent under-qualify
for the marital deduction. If maximum tax savings are desired, the
Code would have to incorporate a formula clause to insure that
the spouse's share is precisely one-half the estate.57 However,
57 For a discussion of formula clauses, see Estate Planning and the Marital Deduction
(Report of Subcommittee of A.B.A. Committee on Estate and Tax Planning). 102
TRUSTS & ESTATES 934 (1963). See also Polasky, Marital Deduction Formula




inclusion of a formula clause would be unrealistic because it ties
state probate law to federal tax law. A change in the marital
deduction provisions might so affect the formula clause that it
would no longer provide maximum tax savings.
In giving the spouse the first $50,000 plus one-half the remain-
ing estate, the drafters have chosen the middle path between
maximum tax savings and providing for the support and mainte-
nance of the spouse. On the other hand, the author's proposal,
which gives the entire estate to the spouse, is premised upon the
findings of the will studies which indicate that support of the
spouse predominates over concern with potential tax savings,
especially among smaller estates.
58
The Code deviates from the spouse-all pattern only when the
decedent's estate exceeds $50,000. In estates over $50,000, Pro-
fessor Sussman discovered that testators, after providing for the
spouse, made gifts to children, spouses of children, heirs more
remote than children, friends and charities. 59 This evidence seems
to lend support to the Code's position. However, Professor Suss-
man also discovered that only two estates out of the 265 in-
testate estates in his sample exceeded $60,000.60 If the Code is to
remain faithful to the philosophy of designing intestate succession
laws to favor the small estate owner, the spouse should receive
the entire estate since intestate estates which exceed $50,000 are
not likely to exceed that figure by large amounts. If the estate
does not greatly exceed $50,000, the spouse will probably need
the entire estate for her support and maintenance. In the dece-
dent's mind, the needs of the spouse will generally take preced-
ence over tax considerations. In those instances where tax con-
siderations are considered more important, the decedent should
write a will if he desires a different result. When the spouse does
wish to achieve maximum tax savings, she can make gifts of the
property or disclaim the amount of property that exceeds the
marital deduction.
In addition to more closely mirroring the decedent's wishes,
distribution of the entire estate to the surviving spouse also elimi-
58M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter V at 13-14.
591d. Chapter XII at 8.601d. Chapter VIII at 1.
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nates the need for protective proceedings since the minor children
would take no property.
61
5. Spouse and Issue From Prior Marriage
Section 2-102(4), in which the Code deals with surviving step-
children, is consistent with the findings of the Cleveland study.
Professor Sussman discovered an exception from the spouse-all
pattern where there were children from a prior marriage. In such
cases the testator generally split his estate between his present
spouse and the stepchildren.6 2 The Code does likewise, giving the
spouse one-half and the children equal shares in the remaining
half.6
3
B. The Remainder of the Estate
The general pattern in section 2-103 for the distribution of the




6 1Section 5-401 provides that a court may, upon petition and after a hearing, appoint a
conservator to manage and protect the property owned by a minor if the court
determines that the minor is incapable of managing the inherited property. When
property passes to minor children, protective proceedings should be available since,
for example, a child three years of age cannot manage an inheritance. Yet protective
proceedings do have drawbacks; a court appointed conservator may not, in fact, be
the most competent person to manage the property, or he may not use the property in
a manner that the intestate would have desired. In addition, the proceedings are both
expensive and cumbersome. Section 5-103 of the Code provides a limited solution to
this problem. If the property passing to the minor children does not exceed $5,000,
payment may be discharged without protective proceedings. Of course, a better
solution is to eliminate the need for protective proceedings altogether.621d. Chapter VI at 35. See also note 14 supra.
-U.P.C.,§§ 2-102(2)-(4), which distribute the first $50,000 of the net intestate estate to the
spouse and divide equally the remainder of the estate, giving the spouse half and the
children or parents the other half, and which divide the estate between the spouse
and the stepchildren, raise a problem of valuation. It must be determined, for in-
stance, when the spouse has received $50,000 worth of the estate. Where there is
partial intestacy, it will also be necessary to value the property passing to the spouse
under the will because the $50,000 limit refers to property the spouse receives,
whether under a will or by intestacy. Although discussion of these problems of
valuation are beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that the Code's division of
shares by fixed money amounts and fractions raises serious problems for the personal
representative who must apportion the assets of the estate. For a discussion of the
general problem of valuation, see J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY: A
TREATISE ON THE APPRAISAL OF PROPERTY FOR DIFFERENT LEGAL PURPOSES (lst
ed., 1937).
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(3) brothers and sisters, or issue of brothers and sisters if there
are no surviving brothers or sisters;
(4) grandparents -divided equally between maternal and pater-
nal grandparents;
(5) issue of grandparents;
(6) escheat (§ 2-105).
1. The "Laughing Heir"
This hierarchy is of special interest both because of the one
problem it does solve and the one that it does not solve. By
terminating distribution at the level of the grandparents' issue, the
Code alleviates the problem of the "laughing heir." This problem
arose from a distributional hierarchy which extended to, and if
necessary beyond, the issue of the intestate's great grandparents.
Given this hierarchy, it was possible for the entire estate to go to
a remote heir who was completely unknown to the intestate.
Upon examination of the data procured in the Chicago study,
Professor Dunham questioned the justification for distributing
property to relatives more distant than the issue of the decedent's
brothers and sisters. It can be inferred from the data that those
decedents who had no relatives closer than issue of brothers and
sisters, but who did have heirs at a more remote level, either
made a will providing for deserving friends and charities, or
simply did not care what happened to their property. 64 The in-
testate laws obviously cannot establish general rules for the dis-
tribution of estates to provide for friends, favorite charities and
the like. As an alternative, most state laws have distributed the
estate to remote heirs on the assumption that the intestate person
would prefer this result to escheat of the estate. 65 This result
would seem proper in a society where people tend to live and die
in the same general vicinity and to have some contacts with their
remote heirs. In contemporary society, however, where geogra-
phic mobility is increasingly characteristic of most families, there
is less reason to continue this practice. The data of the Chicago
study indicates that escheat is no less desirable than distribution
of the estate to remote heirs.
64A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 255 & 263.
65See 4 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, § 239 (1935); T. ATKINSON, supra note 1,
§ 18. Jones, Alabama Probate Law-Need for Revision of Intestate Provisions, 20
ALA. L. REV. 1 (1967).
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2. The Spouse of the Intestate's Child
Under the Code, as well as under most state intestate law, 66 if
a child of the decedent predeceases him, the child's spouse will
not receive an inheritance. In the Cleveland study, Professor
Sussman noted that the absence of close family members trig-
gered gifts to spouses of those absent family members. 67 Profes-
sor Dunham likewise recognized the tendency of testators to
deviate from the Illinois intestate law by including the spouses of
the children. 68 This evidence suggests that the Code be revised to
provide a share for the spouse of a deceased child provided that
the spouse has not remarried.6 9 Moreover, where the issue of the
decedent's children take by the right of representation, 70 a share
should not be given to both the surviving spouse of the decedent's
child and to the issue. Rather, the spouse should serve as a
substitute for the children, taking the share her marriage partner
would have taken had he survived the decedent. A diagram will
illustrate this point:
Decedent
I I -_ -I
A B C(Spouse D)
I I - I
X' X"1
A and B are alive; C is dead but he has left a spouse D and two
children X' and X". Under the Code, the decedent's estate will be
divided into three parts, one for A, one for B and one for C. Since
C is dead, his two children, X' and X", split his one-third share.
However, under the suggested proposal, C's spouse D would take
C's interest provided she has not remarried. If she has remarried,
X' and X" would divide C's interest equally.
66T. ATKINSON, supra note 1, §§ 7,18.
67M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter V at 55.68A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 254.
69The spouse who remarries should not inherit. Remarriage removes the spouse from the
family of her in-laws. If the surviving spouse is the wife, her new husband can
provide for her.
70To take by right of representation means that the issue of a deceased person inherits the




The author's proposal is limited to including only the spouse of
the decedent's children. The decedent's children can, in turn,
provide for the spouses of their children. If the spouses of the
decedent's grandchildren were included, it is possible that the
further division of the estate would substantially reduce the
grandchildren's share. At that level of distribution, the shares are
most likely to be relatively small already, and further division
seems unproductive.
The Chicago study noted a second deviation from the Illinois
intestate law; testators tended to give their children unequal
shares in the estate.71 The Cleveland study found a similar devia-
tion from the Ohio intestate law. 72 Such allotments take a variety
of forms incapable of formulation into a general rule which would
adequately cover all situations. The Code, in section 2-103,
adopts the traditional statutory method of giving the children
equal shares. While perhaps not the best approach in light of the
children's varying economic needs, this provision appears to be
the most practical solution. The decedent is free to write his own
will where the circumstances require a different result.
C. Definitional Provisions
1. Representation
In distributing the non-spouse part of the intestate estate, sec-
tion 2-103 of the Code employs the concept of representation.
73
Section 2-106 defines this concept as follows:
... The estate shall be divided into as many
shares as there are surviving heirs in the
nearest degree of kinship and deceased per-
sons in the same degree who left issue who
survive the decedent, each surviving heir in
the nearest degree receiving one share and
the share of the deceased person in the same
degree being divided among his issue in the
same manner.
71A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 254.
72M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter V at 28.
7 3Per stirpes denotes the method of dividing an estate in which a group of distributees take
the share which their deceased ancestor would have been entitled to take if he
survived. Thus, they take by representation of the deceased ancestor. Per stirpes is
contrasted with per capita, which is the division of an estate into equal shares to be








A (dead) B (dIead) C (dead)
I F II
A' B' B"(dead) C' (dead)
I I _
XV X"1
The estate is first divided into three shares, A', B' and B". The
first generation is ignored since none of its members survived the
decedent. C' is also ignored since he neither survived nor left
issue who survived the decedent. Of the three shares, A' takes
one, B' takes one and X' and X" divide the third.
Currently, the language of those state statutes which require
distribution of the estate "by right of representation" is in-
terpreted in two ways. 74 One interpretation is set forth explicitly
in section 2-106 of the Code; the other interpretation is illustrated
by Maud v. Catherwood. 75 In Maud, rather than using the closest
generation to the decedent that has a surviving heir, the court
used the first generation to divide the shares initially. In the above
illustration, the Maud approach would produce quite different
results; A' would get one-half, B' would take one-fourth and X'
and X" would split the remaining one-fourth. There is no reason
why A' should take a larger share than B'. The Code's method
insures equality in this regard. Section 2-106 of the Code should
eliminate the interpretative problem of distributing by right of
representation.
74See MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946), Comment to § 22.
75Maud v. Catherwood, 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 55 P.2d 111 (1945). In Maud, the testator
set up a trust for the benefit of his spouse and their seven children. He provided for
the termination of the trust at the death of the last beneficiary. Following termination,
the trust was to be distributed to the testator's then living descendents according to
California's intestate succession law. Upon termination four grandchildren and two
great grandchildren were living. The issue was at what generation the estate should be
divided. The Appellants argued that the trust should be divided at the level of the
grandchildren since they were the surviving heirs in the nearest degree of kinship to
the testator. However, the court construed the statutory language of succession "by
right of representation" to mean substitution in an uninterrupted sequence. Thus, the




When two persons die in a common disaster, and it is impos-
sible to determine who died first, the common law provides no
presumption concerning the order of death. 76 This gap created a
difficult problem of fact in cases of intestate succession because
survival is a condition to inheriting the decedent's property. The
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, which has been enacted in
forty-six states, sought to solve this problem by stipulating that
the property of each decedent should be disposed of as if he had
lived. 77 However, the presumption of simultaneous death created
by the Act arises only when there is no proof that the deaths
occurred other than simultaneously.
The Code avoids altogether the need for extensive factual
inquiry with its attendant expense and delay. Section 2-104 of the
Code creates a general rule that a person must survive the dece-
dent by at least 120 hours before he is entitled to an inheritance.
If he dies within the 120 hour period, he is deemed to have
predeceased the intestate. Therefore he will receive no property,
but his heirs are not excluded from any devise. In those cases in
which it is not known whether the person survived the decedent
by at least 120 hours, it is presumed that he failed to survive the
decedent. If the heir fails to survive the 120 hour period, or is
presumed to fail the 120 hour period and is the only heir of the
decedent, the estate would go by escheat (§ 2-105). To prevent
this result, section 2-104 contains a savings clause which waives
the operation of the 120 hour rule where its application would
result in the escheat of the estate.
D. Administrative Provisions
Probate proceedings of intestate estates have been criticized
because of the cost and delay that such proceedings entail. 78
These two factors are of considerable significance to the public.
76
G. PALMER, TRUSTS & SUCCESSION, (2ed. 1968) at 186.
77UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § i. 9C Uniform Laws Annotated.
7 8See MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946), Part IIl: Monographs on Problems in Probate Law,
Paul E. Basye, "Dispensing with Administration." M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chap-
ter XII at 13 notes: "The shorter the time in probate, the lower the court costs, the
lower the attorney's fees and the fiduciary fee, the more positive are the attitudes of
the survivors toward the probate system."
[Vol. 3:2
Uniform Probate Code
Insofar as the Code seeks to provide the public with an efficient
system of transmitting wealth at death, an analysis of the Code's
approach as it affects cost and time is in order.
1. Cost
Although an attorney's fee may be fair in light of the amount of
work necessary to probate an estate under present law, the re-
quirement of a formal court procedure for each step in the dis-
position of an intestate estate results in sizeable legal fees. The
Code's approach is to take probate out of the court and place the
burden of ensuring an accurate and honest distribution of the
estate on the beneficiaries and creditors who can invoke a court
proceeding to protect their interest.79 The provisions which im-
plement this approach should operate indirectly to reduce the cost
of probating an estate.8 0
a. Appointment of the Personal Representative
Administration of an estate is commenced by an appointment
of a personal representative and an issuance of testamentary
letters."' Informal appointment may occur when the registrar
2
of the court approves the application a petitioning party.83 Section
3-203 gives the surviving spouse priority for formal or informal
appointment as personal representative of the intestate estate.
The spouse has the option under Section 3-203 of serving as
personal representative or of nominating some other qualified
person to serve as personal representative. If there is no spouse,
then the surviving heirs of the decendent have equal priority to
serve as personal representative.8 4 In such a situation, the heirs
must agree as to who among them will receive the appointment.
Where a close relationship exists between the decedent and the
79U.P.C. Article III, Introduction.
8 0This article will focus on the Code's administrative provisions only as they apply to
intestate succession.
-lTestamentary Letters are the formal instruments of appointment given to personal
representatives by the Registrar or by court order, upon petition for appointment,
empowering them to begin the exercise of their statutory duties. U.P.C. § 3-103.
82The "Registrar" is either a judge of the court or a person, including the clerk, designated
by a written order filed and recorded in the office of the court. U.P.C. §§ 1-201(),
1-307.




personal representative, the likelihood of a charge for adminis-
tration fees is minimal. In the Chicago study, only one spouse
who served as an executor of the intestate estate charged a fee;
no child of a decedent who served as an executor of an estate
charged a fee.85 One might expect similar results under the Code.
If an interested party fears that informal appointment will pro-
duce a dishonest or inappropriate personal representative, he can
block such an appointment by petitioning for a formal appoint-
ment which invokes a judicial determination of the personal rep-
resentative.8 6 Formal appointments are required if one without
priority is to be appointed. 87 Moreover, when there is no surviv-
ing spouse and the heirs cannot reach agreement on who among
them should be informally appointed as personal representative,
formal appointment offers a means of resolving the dispute.
b. Personal Representative's Bond
Under Code section 3-603, bond is generally not required of
a personal representative, whether formally or informally ap-
pointed. The rationale underlying elimination of a mandatory re-
quirement of bond is that experience has shown that recovery on
a bond is very seldom necessary.88 In the light of this evidence, a
statutory bond requirement would be inconsistent with the Code's
position that beneficiaries and creditors are expected to protect
their own interests.
Drafters of wills for larger estates routinely avoid bond require-
ments through various clauses, apparently relying on the close
relationship between the beneficaries and the administrator for
protection against dishonesty and incompetence. 89 Since the data
of the will studies indicate that most intestate estates will be
smaller than the average testate estate, and since the Code ex-
pressly encourages appointment of a close family member as
8A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 273-276. Of course, where the spouse receives the entire
estate by inheritance, it will not make a great deal of difference if she receives the
estate in one sum as a distribution, or in two sums, one representing her adminis-
trative fee and the other the net amount available for distribution.
86U.P.C. §§ 3-401, 3-414.
8'U.P.C. § 3-203(e).
88R.V. Wellman, "Probate Bonds and the Uniform Probate Code." Memorandum to
Special Committee, Uniform Probate Code (July 8, 1969) at 9, 13.
89
1d. at 4, 5.
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personal representative,9" there is equal reason not to require a
bond in intestate situations.
If an interested person distrusts the appointed personal repre-
sentative, the Code provides safeguards. Section 3-603 makes
bond for a personal representative necessary if (a) a person who
claims an interest in excess of $1,000 demands bond, or (b) the
court orders bond in formal proceedings. A court is required by
section 3-603 to pass judgment on the need for bond in a formal
proceeding. Thus, by petitioning for formal appointment of the
personal representative before an informal appointment has oc-
curred an interested person can be assured that a judge will
examine the need for bond. Informal appointment cannot occur
until five days have elapsed since the decedent's death. 91 Section
3-309 authorizes the registrar to deny an application for informal
appointment for unspecified reasons. Thus, in a backhand way,
the Code vests a public official with discretion to impose a bond
requirement prior to any appointment of a personal representa-
tive. The elimination of bond in most cases should encourage
family members to serve as personal representative in intestate
cases, especially where they might otherwise be prevented from
serving by the expense of posting bond.
c. Appraising the Estate
The Code eliminates court-appointed appraisers and thereby
eliminates an additional charge upon the estate. 92 Instead, the
responsibility for valuing the estate's assets rests with the person-
al representative. 93 If the estate consists primarily of assets which
have an easily ascertainable value, such as publicly traded stocks
and bonds, the personal representative can appraise the estate
without hiring a professional appraiser. This is particularly signifi-
cant since most intestate estates are small, and usually do not
include assets such as business interests and speculative real








A personal representative, whether informally or formally ap-
pointed, is a statutory fiduciary vested with complete powers to
administer the estate.94 The personal representative, unless ap-
pointed in formal proceedings as a "supervised" personal repre-
sentative, 95 is responsible only to creditors and successors of the
decedent. He can collect assets, pay debts and death taxes, and
distribute the remainder of the estate without judicial in-
tervention.96 This serves indirectly to reduce costs. Insofar as
appointment is independent from the probate of an estate, a
formally appointed representative can exercise his statutory
powers without judicial supervision. However, under section
3-107, any interested person, including the personal representa-
tive, can initiate formal probate proceedings which would result in
judicial supervision with its attendant costs. 97 In such a situation,
the scope of formal probate is determined by the petition unless
this is proscribed by the Code. Since interested persons could
compel continuous judicial supervision, it is possible that there
would be only minimal cost savings.
In the Cleveland study, will contests were instituted in only 1.3
percent of the testate cases, and all of these cases were settled.
Claims for debts alleged to be due for or against the estate, or
assets alleged to belong in probate occurred in only six cases. 98
Forty-one percent of all estates grossing between $6,500 and
$15,000 showed no creditor's claims in the probate records.99
These facts suggest that in most cases the personal representative
of the intestate estate will be able to administer the estate without
judicial supervision. Thus, the need for an attorney to guide the
estate through the complex steps of a formal court proceeding
will be eliminated. The personal representative may well require a
lawyer for tax advice, information on informal probate proce-
dures, or guidance in filing papers with the court. However,
94 U.P.C. §§ 3-307, 3-703.
95 A "supervised" personal representative is responsible to the court as well as to in-
terested parties. He is subject to the direction of the court and cannot exercise any
of the powers of a personal representative unless ordered by the court.
9 6U.P.C. §§ 3-704, 3-709, 3-711, 3-715.9 7
U.P.C. §§ 3-401, 3-607, 3-704, 3-721, 3-1001.
98M. SUSSMAN, supra note 5, Chapter VIII at 19.
991d. Chapter VIII at 17.
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substantial savings to the estate should result if the basis of the
lawyer's fee changes from a percentage of the estate, as is
frequently the current practice, to an hourly charge, since fewer
attorney man-hours will be required under the Code's scheme.
2. Time
The Code differs from most state law in two ways which
should result in a more expeditious probate; it employs a short
statute of limitations on creditors claims, and it expands the size
of the estates which can qualify for small estate administration.
a. Statute of Limitations
The Illinois law applicable at the time of the Chicago study
provided a nine month statutory period during which creditors
could file claims against the decedent's estate. Since probate is
court- supervised in Illinois, an estate had to remain in probate
for a minimum of nine months.10 0 Professor Dunham discovered
that the modal time required for probate was ten months. 10 ' In his
opinion, the nine month statutory period was the most significant
barrier to prompt probate.'
0 2
Under the Code, the appointment of a personal representative
followed by public notice to the estate's creditors triggers a four
month limitation on creditors claims against the decedent's es-
tate. 10 3 Since probate under the Code may occur without court
supervision, the personal representative could distribute the as-
sets before the termination of the four month period. However, he
would be liable for improper distribution, and the distributees
may be required to return the property or its proceeds.' 0 4 The
four month period is an improvement over most state law and
should reduce the time required to probate an estate.1
0 5
I
00A. DUNHAM, supra note 2, at 269.
1O1id.
102 1d. at 270-273.
'°3U.P.C. § 3-803(a)(1).
104U.P.C. §§ 3-712, 3-909.
'°5OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2113.53 (Page 1953). In Ohio, the statutory limitation on
creditor's claims is six months following the appointment of an administrator. N.Y.
ESTATES, POWERS & TRUST LAW § 11-1.5 (McKinney 1967). New York cuts off
creditor's claims seven months after the appointment of the administrator. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 733.15 (1961) & § 734.04 (1945). In Florida an administrator can distribute
the assets of the estate six months after publication of notice to creditors.
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b. Small Estate Administration
If an estate qualifies for small estate administration, 10 6 the
personal representative may immediately distribute its assets
without notifying creditors since the assets are exempt from cred-
itors' claims. 10 7 The homestead and family allowances which are
available if the decedent's spouse or minor and dependent chil-
dren survive added to the exempt property provision which ap-
plies if the decedent's spouse or children survive would qualify an
estate worth $14,500 for small estate administration.10 8 The Code
has significantly departed from state law by substantially in-
creasing the value of an estate which can qualify for small estate
administration.109 The Cleveland study showed the average in-
testate estate to be $8,599.110 Thus, in contrast to state law, the
Code's summary procedure should encompass the majority of
intestate estates. The personal representative will be able to dis-
tribute the estate as soon as he is appointed. The representative
may be appointed as early as five days after the decedent's death.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 1000 (West 1953). Four months after publication of notice to
creditors an administrator can petition a court for permission to distribute the assets
of the estate. The court may in its discretion allow a distribution of the entire estate.
106U.P.C. § 1203. This section defines small estates as those estates whose value does not
exceed the homestead allowance, exempt property, family allowance, costs and
expenses of administration, reasonable funeral expenses, and reasonable and neces-
sary medical and hospital expenses of the last illness of the decedent.
0 7 U.P.C. § 1203.
10 The homestead allowance of $5,000 is granted by U.P.C. § 2-401. The decedent's
surviving spouse or minor and dependent children are the persons who are entitled to
the allowance.
U.P.C. § 2-402 authorizes an exempt property allowance of $3,500. This section
stipulates that household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances and personal
effects must be selected. If those assets do not yield $3,500 worth of property, then
other assets of the estate can be selected to the extent necessary to make up the
$3,500 value. The decedent's surviving spouse or children are the recipients of the
exempt property.
U.P.C. § 2-403 grants a family allowance to the decedent's spouse and children
whom he supported. U.P.C. § 2-404 stipulates that the personal representative can
take the family allowance in one lump sum of $6,000, or in monthly installments of
$500 for one year.
'°gMICH. COMP LAWS § 708.29 (1968). Small estate administration in Michigan is limited
to estates not exceeding $5,000 consisting of personal property only. OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2115.13 (Page 1968). Ohio exempts estates of $2,500 and under from
administration provided the decedent's spouse survives. Ohio further restricts the
exemption from administration if only the decedent's children survive. N.Y. SURRO-
GATE'S COURT PROCEDURE ACT § 1301 (McKinney 1967). New York has a summary
procedure for estates which do not exceed $3,000 and consist of personal property.
°1 0 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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IV. Conclusion
The Uniform Probate Code's provisions on intestate succes-
sion attempt to provide an acceptable estate plan for the man of
modest assets who dies intestate by fashioning a pattern of dis-
tribution that satisfies the usual wishes of such individuals. The
Code has, for the large part, fulfilled this goal. However, the data
of the two will studies suggest that certain changes are in order.
The following alterations would bring the Code's plan more into
line with the general pattern indicated by those studies:
(1) Where the decedent leaves a surviving
spouse and children (issue) who are issue of
the decedent-spouse marriage, the entire es-
tate should go to the spouse.''
(2) Where the decedent leaves a spouse
and a parent(s), but no issue, the spouse
should take the entire estate."
2
(3) Where a child of the decedent has died,
but has left a spouse who has not remarried,
such spouse should take the deceased child's
share."13
Any state legislature contemplating adoption of the Code should
consider these provisions as alternatives to the present Code
pattern."1
4
The Code's estate plan for the small estate owner is con-
ceptually sound and in the public interest. However, it is political-
ly vulnerable. No forceful interest groups have supported the
Code's plan, and it is unlikely that any group will. Certainly the
"' 1See text accompanying notes 46 through 54 supra.
112See text accompanying notes 40 through 49 supra.
" 3See text accompanying note 66 supra.
"4An important objective of the Uniform Probate Code is to achieve uniformity among,
state probate law. Consequently, a state legislature should change the Code only
when important considerations make it necessary. The author believes that the
suggested changes warrant serious consideration. However, it should be noted that
intestate estates exceeding $50,000 are rare. Only two intestate estates in the Cleve-
land study had gross assets of $60,000 or more. See M. SUssMAN, supra note 5,
Chapter VIII at 1. The suggestion that the spouse be given the entire estate rather
than dividing the balance over $50,000 with the children of the decedent-spouse
marriage or parents of the decedent should be evaluated from this perspective.
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small estate owner himself exerts little influence in legislative
chambers. However, the will studies clearly indicate the need for
reform, and the Code has responded with a simple, inexpensive
method of distributing the average man's property to his loved
ones. Whether the average man will in fact ever be given the
benefits of this plan may well depend upon whether the organized
bar promotes the cause of the small estate owner.
